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INTRODUCTION

he Florida Administrative Procedure Act is now twenty years
old.' The Florida State University Law Review celebrated the
APA's fifteenth anniversary with a symposium that examined the
Act's origins, evaluated the Act's success in establishing a balanced
procedural framework for developing agency policy and resolving administrative disputes, and debated changes that might improve the
Act. 2 On the Act's twentieth anniversary, the mood is not so celebratory. In the most recent legislative session, the Act received an unprec* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law; Immediate Past Chair of the
Administrative Law Section of The Florida Bar. B.A., 1971, N.Y.U.; J.D., 1975, Univ. of Miami.
1. The Florida Administrative Procedure Act is found at chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
This Article will refer to the Administrative Procedure Act both as the APA and the Act.
2. The Sympsrsium may be found at 18 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 607 (1991).
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edented barrage of criticism. Many proposed amendments to the Act
were advanced and outright repeal was suggested.
The most surprising aspect of the 1994 session was not that attacks
were made on the APA, but that the Act escaped those attacks unscathed. Many APA related bills were filed. Both the Senate and
House had select committees working on APA reform. The assumption before the session, when the House Select Committee on Agency
Rules was holding workshops and soliciting suggestions for amendments to the Act, was that changes were inevitable. The only question
was which changes would be approved.
Why did the APA come under such strong attack? Are major
changes in Florida administrative procedure really needed? If so, what
changes should be made? There are many different views on these important issues advanced in this Symposium. In this article, I will present my views.

II.

WHY ALL THE EXCITEMENT?

Why did such a large number of legislative proposals to amend the
APA emerge during the 1994 session? The immediate reaction might
be that all this activity proves something must be very wrong with the
present APA. I take a different view. I do not believe there is a crisis
in administrative procedure in this state today.
There is always room for improvement in any procedural system. I
could suggest, and indeed have suggested, changes that I believe could
improve the Act.' But, I' do not find anything fundamentally wrong
with the APA in its current form. All the clamor for amendment in
1994 has done little to clarify what changes should be made to improve the Act. If anything, it has confused the issue. So many off-thecuff proposals were advanced that people are hesitant to suggest even
well-thought-out changes. The Legislature should wait to amend the
Act until after this clamor subsides.
If the Act is not fundamentally flawed, what is the source of the
clamor? The answer is that there is more than one source. As David
Gluckman argues 4 some of the support for changing the APA comes
from opponents of growth management.' Their attention has focused
on procedure now that property rights advocates and growth manage-

3.

See, e.g., Stephen T. Maher, We're No Angels: Rulemaking and Judicial Review in

Florida,18
4.

FLA. ST.

U. L.

REv.

767 (1991).

David Gluckman, 1994 APA Legislation: The History, The Reasons, The Results, 22
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 349, 354 (1994).
5. For a comprehensive discussion of growth management in Florida, see David L. Powell,
Managing Florida'sGrowth: The Next Generation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 226 (1993).
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ment opponents have failed to bring growth management law closer to
their respective legal positions. Also, growth management has brought
people, formerly unfamiliar with the state bureaucracy and the APA,
into close contact with both. For many property owners and local
governments, the experience has not been pleasant. This has redirected some of the anger over growth management from the Legislature, which established the present growth management regime by
statute, 6 to the state bureaucracy that enforces growth management
law. This change has brought focus on the APA, the statute that some
feel should, and if amended could, do much more to protect them
from the state bureaucracy.
Another reason that there were so many proposals to change the
APA this year was that, at some point, it seemed that the Act was "in
play." In a business context, a company may find itself "in play"
when it puts itself up for sale or becomes a target for acquisition.
When a company is "in play," a parade of suitors, bidders and speculators may suddenly arrive at its door. Some have never heard of the
company before. Some may be unsure about what the company does.
All believe that an opportunity is at hand and none wants to be left
out because something is going to happen that will profit those who
are well-positioned.
In 1994, the APA was "in play." When it appeared that major
changes were imminent, people began lining up to take advantage of
that opportunity. No one wanted to be left out. Lobbyists who envisioned helping themselves or their clients would have been foolish to
ignore this golden opportunity. Even legislative staff tried to conform
the Act to their vision of how the APA should operate.
While some who understand the Act tried to benefit from this opportunity, it was clear from the beginning that understanding the
APA was not a requirement for proposing changes to it. Not only
were many advocates of change unburdened by any knowledge of or
experience with the Act, many seemed inclined to use the legislator's
sharpest tool-passing amendments to the Act-when some duller instrument, such as legislative oversight, could better address their concerns.
III.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

In a single sentence, the various problems that some see with the
Act today are that the bureaucracy is out of control, especially in the
area of rulemaking, and the APA is not strong enough, or is not
6. See ch. 85-55, 1985 Fla. Laws 207 (creating The Growth Management Act of 1985).
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cheap enough to use, or is not simple enough to use, to be as available
as it should be to stop this runaway bureaucratic train. How should
the Legislature respond to concerns like this? First, it should confirm
whether these problems really exist. Second, assuming it can determine that problems exist, the Legislature should determine whether to
get involved in solving these problems, or whether to allow affected
individuals, with the aid of the courts or the executive branch, to deal
with these problems themselves. Third, if it decides to get involved,
the Legislature should take stock of its options before deciding what
to do. The best solution may not be to amend the APA. If a bill is
needed, it must be carefully crafted. The APA is not just a statute, it
is the legislative description of a working system, the only system
available to resolve agency disputes and create agency policy. Careless
changes to that system may have unintended and unwelcome effects
on agency policy and action.
A.

Provingthe Problem

First, has the Legislature confirmed that a problem exists? Anyone
familiar with the history of the Florida APA, especially on the topic
of protecting legislative prerogatives from agency encroachment, will
approach with some skepticism the complaint that the bureaucracy is
on a rampage of rulemaking in excess of delegated authority. I have
noted elsewhere 7 that the concern that agencies are usurping legislative
lawmaking prerogatives is surprising because the Act contains such
stringent protections against encroachment. These protections include
the unique Florida rule challenge remedy, designed by Senator Dempsey Barron, a legendary force in the Legislature who was quick to protect legislative power.8 His concerns about what he called "phantom
government" -government by a bureaucracy bent on enacting as rules
legislative proposals that were rejected in the prior session-led to his
inclusion of sections providing formal procedures for substantially affected parties to challenge rules in the Florida APA as originally
adopted.9 These powerful remedies are still available today.
Over the past few years, legislators have returned to the theme that
agencies are out of control in rulemaking. 10 Some of that concern has

7. Stephen T. Maher, Administrative Procedure Act Amendments: The 1991 and 1992
Amendments to the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 367, 438
(1992).
8. Dem., Panama City, 1957-1988.
9. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1993) (authorizing challenges to proposed rules); § 120.56, (authorizing challenges to existing rules).
10. 1 noted this dynamic in the 1992 session, and it was evident in the 1994 session as well.
See Maher, supra note 7.
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resulted from a misunderstanding of how the process works. For example, legislators who measure administrative failure by the growing
thickness of rulebooks may be reading the popular press," but they
have ignored the fact that the Legislature itself, through the 1991
amendments to the APA, mandated the adoption of agency policy by
rule and thus created this increase in rulebook size. 2 In addition, the
1991 amendments were not a mistake. They were widely hailed as an
improvement to the system because they made it likely that constituents would find policy in a rule book, not discover it for the first time
when it was applied to them in an agency proceeding. 3
In 1994, legislators clearly had the bureaucracy, and their perceived
inability to control it, on their minds. Many proposals were advanced
as "solutions," but the problems these proposals addressed were
sometimes less than clear. During the 1994 Regular Session, many
people favored "APA reform." The phrase "APA reform" itself suggests that something important is wrong with the APA and needs to
be changed. If true, this is serious. The APA is the basic document
that structures administrative decision making in Florida. It specifies
the procedures that state agencies must follow when they make decisions, and provides procedural protections for those whose substantial
interests are affected by these decisions. Significant changes to the
APA would have far-reaching effects on state government and on the
millions it regulates.
For many legislators, the need for "reform" was not a matter of
proof. It was an article of faith. For some, it was a matter of political
faith. Some legislators seemed to believe in the continued political viability of the 1980's theme: let's get government off the backs of people. Those in this camp felt a great distrust for all bureaucracy and,
for them rulemaking reform could be summed up in the phrase "no
rules are good rules." For others, the call for reform was an opportunity to press for procedural advantages or self-serving benefits. For
some, the commotion provided a good opportunity to suggest radical
changes. No proposal was too radical, not even a call for repeal of the
APA. At some point, reform became a matter of political necessity.
So much had been invested by those seeking reform, that some reform, any reform, was necessary to save face and justify expenditures.

11. See, e.g., The Red Tape Tax, FLA. TREND, Aug. 1993 at 31, 32-33 (noting that the
Florida Administrative Code is growing at a rate of about a thousand pages a year and the
Legislature at best barely influences the bureaucracy generating this mass of regulation).

12. Ch. 91-30, 1991 Fla. Laws 241; ch. 91-191, 1991 Fla. Laws 1604 (codified at FiA.
§ 120.535 (1993)).
13. See Maher, supra note 7.

STAT.
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For those who sought proof of the need for reform, select committees in both chambers held hearings that showcased examples of
agency abuse. Constituents told of bureaucrats running amok, denying permits, adopting rules beyond legislative authority, and taking
other actions that had done them wrong. The committees responded
sympathetically. Cross-examination became a lost art. Bureaucrats
were summoned. Heads were bowed. The "riot act" was read. Apologies were delivered.
Despite this showing, the assumption that something was fundamentally wrong with the administrative process in Florida escaped
proof. It appeared quite clear from the committee testimony that the
people who testified had been wronged, if at all, by bad bureaucrats,
not by bad administrative procedures. Thus, from the testimony, it
appeared that if the Act was guilty of anything, it was guilty of failing
to stop bad bureaucrats cheaply and easily. This is clearly a tough job
for any piece of paper. These hearings were a forum for constituents
to vent their anger-not to find out whether, and to what extent, the
bureaucracy was out of control. Agency witnesses recognized this and
did not even try to mount a defense. For most of the session, the Gov4
ernor's office was conspicuously absent from these proceedings.'
B.

Whether to Get Involved

Even if the Legislature is unhappy with the degree of protection
that the APA provides constituents, this is not necessarily a reason to
amend the APA. Before amending the APA, the Legislature should
consider both whether to get involved and how to get involved.
People have always had problems with government agencies and
they always will. That is why we have laws and lawyers. That is also
why legislators have traditionally had a role helping constituents who
have problems with government agencies. The traditional response of
legislators helping constituents has not been to propose new legislation. It has been to provide help on an individual basis through aides
doing constituent service, and through legislators contacting agencies

14. 1 strongly dispute Sally Bond Mann's suggestion that the executive branch "successfully
resisted reformation of the Administrative Procedure Act." Sally Bond Mann, Legislative Reform of the Administrative Procedure Act: A Tale of Two Committees, FLA. B. J. July/Aug.

1994, at 57, 60. I was surprised by the lack of resistance by the executive branch to the forces of
"reform." There was virtually no public response by the executive branch to charges made
against agencies during public hearings, and there certainly was much to say. Rather than anger
legislators bent on reform by responding to constituent complaints, the Governor's office decided to cut a deal with the House early in the session to adopt significant changes to the Act.
That deal was embodied in the version of HR 237 that emerged from the House Select Committee. Fortunately, it did not pass.
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on the constituent's behalf. Constituent complaints have not been,
and should not now become, the basis for setting the legislative
agenda. Constituent problems should rarely be solved by general law
because such legislation affects everybody, and everybody rarely
shares the particular constituent problem motivating the legislation.
Amending the APA should be a last resort, not a standard response
to constituent complaints. There are dangers inherent in using legislation-especially legislation drafted by people unfamiliar with administrative procedure-to try to address concerns about the effectiveness
and workability of the APA. There are reasons the Legislature does
not fiddle with the Evidence Code, 5 and that the Supreme Court uses
a variety of committees to provide advice on how to revise court rules.
Changing a system of rules is tricky business. The first problem is that
a system reflects a balance of underlying values, and that balance
changes as the system changes. Second, there are dangers and difficulties in using procedural rules to create substantive advantages for constituents. Third, there are costs associated with the procedural rules
governing the bureaucracy that have gone almost unnoticed during the
debate. Fourth, there are better ways to revise the APA than by declaring "open season" on the Act during the legislative session.
1. The Balance
"Reformers" have shown little respect for the procedural system
that has worked well to protect their constituents against abuses of
agency power for the past twenty years. They also have seemed to
forget that when it was adopted, the Florida APA was truly a reform.' 6 Creating and maintaining a good procedural system is no easy
feat. All procedural systems require compromises between important
underlying, competing values. All reflect a balance among those values.
An administrative procedure act must balance efficiency, accuracy
and acceptability. 7 These values pull against one another. Insistence
on accuracy may make a system less efficient as hearings increase the
cost and delay the process to provide more assurance that a correct
result is reached. Insistence on efficiency may make it less possible to
assure accuracy as procedural safeguards are abandoned to reduce
costs and speed up the process. The balance struck among competing

15.
16.

FLA. STAT. §§ 90.101-.958 (1993).
See Symposium, The New Florida Administrative Procedure Act: Selected Presenta-

tions from the Attorney General'sConference, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 64 (1975).
17. Roger Crampton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearingsin Nuclear Power Plant Sitings,
58 VA. L. REV. 585, 592-93 (1972).
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values must not only be acceptable, it must be workable over time.
Our APA has given a high value to accuracy and acceptability and a
relatively low value to efficiency. This choice is evident in the "varied
and abundant remedies" 8 provided by the Act in general and in the
availability of the rule challenge remedy in particular. Legislators proposing amendments "willy nilly" do not seem to understand that if
their proposals are adopted, they may do more than change the law,
they may change the fundamental balance of the Act in ways that may
be neither wise nor sustainable over time.
a.

The Simplifiers

Some reformers have sought a more simple Act. They cringe when
they hear about some of the procedural complexities of the APA.
They ask how an ordinary person could possibly succeed in pursuing
the APA's "varied and abundant remedies," or could afford to pay
counsel to assist them in doing so. 19 It is a fact that some of the Act's
strongest remedies can become complex and costly, especially when
vigorously contested. It is also true that the Act empowers, and relies
to a great degree, on substantially interested individuals to stop agencies who are abusing power.
This has both a positive and a negative side. On the positive side,
the Act places extraordinary power to fight agencies in the hands of
substantially affected persons-power unavailable outside Florida,
and power that often has been used to shape agency policy in ways
that more accurately reflect the concerns of those who use the remedies the Act provides20 On the negative side, the APA often saddles
those who take action to protect themselves with the cost of that undertaking. Attorneys fees are awarded to those who use the Act's remedies in only limited circumstances. Thus, the APA is not without
complexity and cost.

18. Department of Gen. Services v. Willis, 344 So. 2d 580, 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
19. An example of proposed legislation motivated by such concerns can be found in section
12 of the version of House Bill 237 that died at the end of the 1994 Extended Session. That
section called for legislative review of the APA by Oct. 1, 1996,
to consider changes to that chapter based upon the following factors: (1)An administrative process that is not overly complex or burdensome; (2) An administrative process that provides easy access to the process for parties affected by agency action; (3)
An administrative process that is not costly to participate in; (4) An administrative
process that gives equal consideration to the position of the affected party and the
agency.
Of course, the same bill also contained a number of new requirements that would further complicate the administrative process.
20. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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When reformers argue for simplification of the Act and against this
complexity and cost, they threaten the power that complexity creates,
whether they recognize it or not. That is the reason people are hesitant
to support simplification. A "lite" version of the APA, one that can
be used without counsel or expense by any regulated person, would be
easier to use, but would not protect people from an out-of-control
bureaucracy as well as the present Act.
Special interests understand the connection between procedural
complexity and substantive power in the administrative process. When
they want to turn the process to their advantage what do they propose? They propose the addition of further complexities. That is exactly what happened this year. How can procedural complexities
create substantive power?2 1 Consider the following, common example.
Agencies that implement legislative mandates sometimes have difficulty complying with procedural complexities while adopting rules.
The more complex the rulemaking procedure, the more likely it is that
agencies will make mistakes. Someone who wants changes made to a
proposed rule can suggest changes, but the agency may generally ignore those suggestions if the matters are within agency discretion.
However, if a person who wants changes made can identify the procedural mistakes made by the agency during rulemaking and file a challenge to the proposed rule on the basis of those mistakes, that
challenge may provide the leverage necessary to persuade the agency
to change the proposed rule in a way acceptable to the challenger.
This is how that commonly occurs. On paper, a challenge to the
proposed rule is filed seeking to use the agency's mistakes to require
the agency to begin the rulemaking process again. This could delay the
adoption of the rules and could create an opportunity for other challengers to enter the proceedings. In fact, the challenger often just
wants the agency to make small changes to the proposed rule, sometimes changes that are very important to the challenger but of little
importance to the agency. On these facts, it is easy to see why agencies
often compromise by making small changes in the proposed rule in
return for dropping the challenge. But for the procedural complexities
that were identified and properly raised by the challenger, no substantive concession would have been made. This is one way that procedural complexities can translate into substantive power.
Those who call for simplification are saying, in effect, that they are
willing to give up the power that complexity creates. For them, effi-

21. It is the type of complexity, not the amount of complexity, that matters where the creation of power by complexity is concerned. An example of how the Florida APA can create
power for affected persons through its procedural complexity follows.
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ciency is more important than accuracy. While some may now feel
this way, this is a different balance than the Act has traditionally
struck among these competing values. The Florida APA has permitted
significant potential inefficiency as a matter of policy choice, for example, by permitting trial-type challenges during rulemaking. That
history, the chorus of cries for even more complexity in the APA that
were heard during the session, and the Legislature's refusal to repeal
complexities such as the rule challenge in prior years, even at the Governor's urging, 2 all suggest that too much simplification may not be
an acceptable alternative.
The trend of legislative concern has been to provide for more, not
less, protection of constituents from the bureaucracy.
b.

The Complicators

Some have advocated the addition of more complexities in rulemaking. The system that would emerge from such reforms would make
rulemaking significantly more difficult for the agencies that conduct
it. Thus, those who advocate more complexity advocate an even less
efficient bureaucracy. The complicators should keep in mind that the
Florida APA already provides the strongest arsenal of defenses
against agency encroachment on an individual's substantial interests
of any APA in the United States, especially in connection with rulemaking. 23 For this reason, the Florida APA can be one of the least
efficient APAs. The argument that further complexities are essential
to protect us from our administrative government leads to the question, if we have the strongest rulemaking remedies of any state, and
those remedies are sorely inadequate, how have other states managed
to survive?
The development of more complex rulemaking process would have
an especially great impact on agencies today because, in 1991, amendments to the APA required agencies to adopt their policies as rules
and provided an additional administrative remedy for agencies who
fail to comply.2 4 Those amendments have had the effect of substan-

22. For a discussion of the Governor's agenda for change in prior years, see Maher, supra
note 7, at 408-18. Professor Dore was concerned that reform proposals designed to enhance
efficiency do not unacceptably abridge citizen participation. Patricia A. Dore, Florida Limits
Policy Development Through Administrative Adjudication and Requires Indexing and A vailability ofAgency Orders, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 437, 454-55 (1991).
23. Patricia A. Dore, Seventh AdministrativeLaw Conference Agenda and Report, 18 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 703, 725 (1991); Patricia A. Dore, Access to FloridaAdministrative Proceedings,
13 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 967, 1012 (1986); Maher, supra note 7, at 368.
24. Maher, supra note 7, at 390-408.
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tially increasing rulemaking activity."5 Making it more difficult and
more expensive for agencies to carry out their newly expanded rulemaking responsibilities will further reduce agency efficiency.
Efficiency is a core value in the design of any administrative process. If efficiency is discounted, at some point the system itself will
cease to function. While some degree of inefficiency may be important to encourage correct and acceptable decisions, making it harder
for agencies to hurt people also makes it harder for agencies to help
people. Some of the discussion during the 1994 Regular Session
seemed to assume that the less that agencies can do, the better for all
of us. This approach is inconsistent with the present level of society's
reliance on the administrative state. Like it or not, government plays a
central role in our lives and it acts largely through the bureaucracy. At
some point, complexities can cease becoming guarantees of accuracy
and, instead, can become roadblocks to effective government. The
challenge we face is to maintain tight enough control over government
agencies to assure that they follow the direction set by elected policymakers without making them too inefficient to carry the heavy burden
of responsibility they are delegated. That is, of course, the Rubik's
Cube of administrative government. The difficulty of striking this balance does not justify ignoring it when devising amendments to the
Act.
2.

Dangers and Difficulties

Legislators are comfortable helping constituents and contributors
by shaping substantive law to their benefit. However, our APA wisely
embraces the concept of uniform procedures that apply across varying
substantive contexts. For example, the same rulemaking procedures
apply agency to agency. This means that changing the rulemaking
process designed to help one group in one context will not only hurt
the group's opponent, but it may also hurt that same group in another
context. Complexities added to the rulemaking process to help opponents kill growth management rules would also be available to prevent
the Department of Insurance from adopting rules to protect those
same individuals from insurance scams.
There are other concerns. Constituent problems may not be as important to the people of Florida as they are to the constituent. Also, if
ninety-nine percent of the process that is working is ignored while a
remedy is fashioned to fix the one percent that is not working, the
solution that results could cause problems for the entire system.

25.

Id. at 438.
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Costs

Reformers have shown little concern about the cost of reform. The
cost of changing the APA, especially if it involves repealing the Act, is
substantial. Years of experience under the old provisions may be rendered worthless. Bureaucrats may have to relearn basic rules governing how they must do their jobs. They may have to revise rules,
rewrite forms, and change parts of their routine. Those who are affected by agency action may also have to retool. They may press their
issues with less confidence at first as they learn to navigate through
new provisions. They must expend resources to relearn the procedural
system that could otherwise be directed to solving substantive problems. The courts also will have to learn the new provisions and gauge
the effect of changes on the system as a whole. As with any new provision, there will be ambiguities and uncertainties for lawyers to litigate and for the courts to clarify. All this will take years and much
constituent money to achieve.
4.

There Are Better Ways

The last legislative session showed us how not to amend the APA.
Some may disagree. Sally Bond Mann argues that "after two special
legislative committees investigated allegations of agency abuse and assembled respected experts in administrative law to draft reform proposals, the fact that none of those proposals passed the legislature
leads one to question whether meaningful revision of Ch. 120 can be
accomplished." 2 6 Because I was mentioned as one of those experts,"1 I
note my disagreement with this statement. First, I agree with the
shortcomings of the Task Force approach noted by David Gluckman . 8 Second, I contest the suggestion that the experts drafted the
proposed legislation. The House Select Committee and its staff controlled the drafting. I suspected from the outset that people like me
were invited to join the Task Force to give its product credibility,
rather than to shape the outcome. The way that my name, and the
names of others in the field, are used in Sally Mann's article confirms
my suspicions.
Third, from the outset, the Task Force had the wrong focus. It was
not interested in determining whether problems existed, whether the
Legislature should address those problems, or which method of legislative control should be employed. The House Select Committee
skipped those steps of the analysis, as it engaged in the business of
26.
27.
28.

Mann, supra note 14, at 60.
Id. at n.3.
Gluckman, supra note 4, at 350.
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proposing significant changes to the APA. The only question put to
the experts was what kind of legislative changes could be made to the
APA. No proposed change was off-limits for discussion. A long and
diverse list of proposed changes was generated.
After attending just one meeting of the Task Force, I had serious
misgivings about the process. In a letter to the Staff Director shortly
after that first meeting, I suggested:
While I think it was a very good idea for the Committee to seek
input from people like me in connection with its work, the kind of
wide ranging study of the APA that our efforts suggest may be
underway may be better accomplished through another process.
When Governor Askew sought to reexamine administrative
procedure in the early 1970's he turned to the Law Revision Council.
While I know that you and your staff have been working hard on
these issues, I do not think that our Task Force can assist you and
the Committee with the kind of input that a group like the Law
Revision Council could provide. The kind of major changes to the
APA that we are discussing, such as changing the rules on
consideration of hearsay evidence, revising the law governing judicial
review, changing rulemaking procedures again, offering simplified
administrative proceedings and the like, will prompt reexamination
of other provisions. It is hard to make changes like these without
making a more careful study of the APA as a whole. I do not think
we are presently well equipped for a task of that magnitude. A less
careful study will create new problems that will make demands on
the Legislature's time and attention in future years.29
I chose not to participate further in the Task Force.
If the Legislature cannot be dissuaded from making significant
changes to the APA, the Legislature should at least enlist significant
technical assistance. The Legislature should either revitalize the Law
Revision Council 0 and assign this matter to that group for study and
recommendations, or should create an APA study commission of similar composition and assign it a similar task. 3
C. How to Get Involved
If a procedural problem can be articulated that should be addressed
by the Legislature, then thought should be given as to how the Legis29. Letter from Stephen T. Maher to Cliff Nilson, Staff Dir. of the Legislative Task Force
on the APA (Aug. 10, 1993) (copy on file with author).
30. The Law Revision Council did good work in the 1960's and 1970's helping to modernize
the statutory law of Florida. It was a nonpartisan group that studied acts needing comprehensive
revision and developed proposed legislation. The present APA was developed in this fashion.
Stephen T. Maher, The Seventh Administrative Law Conference Chairman's Introduction to the
Symposium Issue, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 607 (1991).
31. The proposal that an APA study commission should be appointed was considered
briefly in the Senate during the session. It was rejected because of budgetary considerations.
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lature should address it. Amending the APA should be a last resort.
Procedural changes can create difficulties if their consequences are
not carefully evaluated and they can cost government, regulated persons and the public at large much more than legislators suspect.
I do not contend that the APA should never be amended. The 1991
amendments are a good example of changes that were necessary, that
were carefully considered over more than one session, and that were
consistent with the balance struck in the original APA.32 Some modest
degree of amendment, when necessary, should occur. The failure of
Congress to amend the general rulemaking provisions of the federal
APA to keep pace with developments in the area left the federal system without a clear set of rulemaking procedures. Because of Congressional inaction, the federal APA has been treated more like a
constitutional provision than a statute on this issue." This treatment
has allowed the federal courts to shape rulemaking procedure under
the federal APA to a much greater degree than is possible in Florida.
While that degree of legislative neglect is probably excessive, the prospect of yearly amendments to the APA, at the other extreme, is
equally unappealing.
If amendment is a last resort, what options are available? There are
many. The most overlooked response to perceived agency abuse is legislative oversight. This is different than oversight in the form of committees taking testimony about abuse to justify APA amendments, or
Joint Administrative Procedure Committee (JAPC) review, or review
in the Appropriations Committee. Instead, I suggest revitalizing oversight by substantive legislative committees. There has been a big
change over the last twenty years in the way that the Florida Legislature performs its agency oversight responsibility. There has been a
shift of both power and attention from the work of the substantive
committees to the appropriations process. This is understandable
from a political perspective, but it is unfortunate because the Legislature knows less about the actual operations of the agencies it funds
than it would if it was more involved in more substantive oversight.
Legislative oversight is no panacea. There are limits to its effectiveness, and problems can arise with that process as well. 3 4 But in the
area of administrative procedure, the record has been promising. The
1991 amendments to the Act came out of the oversight process."

32. See Maher, supra note 7, at 380.
33. Maher, supra note 3, at 833.
34. For a deeper look at the promise and problems of legislative oversight in Florida, see
Dan R. Stengle & James P. Rhea, Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Legislative Struggle
to Contain Rulemaking by Executive Agencies, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 415, 417-30 (1993).
35. Id. at 427.
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Also, traditional legislative oversight will yield more accurate data
than the select committees this past session were able to gather on
where problems exist and how serious those problems are. Horror stories do not give a fair picture of the bureaucratic reality. Reading
agency employees the "riot act" may produce some bowed heads and
a sense of satisfaction, but it is unlikely to produce much positive
change. Unfortunately, to promote real change, the Legislature must
spend time slogging through the details, developing expertise, and
putting aside drama in favor of practical intervention. That is not the
stuff of sound bites. But in the end, it will prove much more constructive than passing radical amendments to the APA, or repealing it altogether for some yet to be articulated alternative.
Especially where the major goal is to achieve better legislative control of executive action, the use of tools such as legislative oversight
by the substantive committees, discussions with recalcitrant agencies
during the appropriations process, and JAPC review of agency rules
can together play a role in reestablishing legislative control over the
bureaucracy.
Even if the Legislature works to address the problems that exist
without amending the APA, it still may reach a point where everyone
agrees that there are a few issues that can and should be addressed by
making changes to the APA. That is the point where a legislative
agenda should begin to form.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS ADVANCED DURING THE SESSION

A.

Legislative Suspension of Rules

Although legislative oversight has not captured the legislative imagination, proposals to legislatively suspend agency rules have. Legislative suspension, as it was described during the session, would allow
the Legislature, perhaps acting through the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC), to vote to suspend a rule that an agency
refuses to withdraw at the JAPC's request. The suspended rule would
then come before the whole Legislature for review in the following
session. The specifics of the legislative suspension proposals made
during the 1994 Regular Session varied greatly.
Legislative suspension of rules is a problematic topic because of the
concern that all rule suspensions may be unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.3 6 The distinction between a legislative veto of

36. For a more detailed analysis of the constitutional and other issues raised by legislative
suspension and veto, see Stengle & Rhea, supra note 34.
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rules, that even legislators who endorse suspension seem to agree
would require a constitutional amendment to establish, and a legislative suspension of rules, that is really the same thing as a veto, but
over a more limited time period, may prove to be a distinction without
a difference if the constitutionality of legislative suspension is challenged in the courts.
Not only is suspension constitutionally suspect, its value may be
mostly symbolic. Even proponents of suspension agree that it would
be rarely used because it presents practical problems that even advocates of this approach have not worked out. If rules are suspended,
how can an agency deal with the absence of rules during the suspension? Can an agency adopt emergency rules, or substitute rules, to fill
the gap created by the suspension? If those substitute rules were too
similar to the suspended rule, they might be suspended also. Does this
mean an agency must change policy during suspension? Could an
agency continue to follow the policy the suspended rules embodied,
but follow it as nonrule policy? If the agency did that, how could that
non-rule policy be suspended? If the suspended rule was later approved or left intact after legislative review, what effect would that
have on rights determined during the period of suspension, when the
rule was not permitted to be used? Would retroactive reinstatement of
the policy be fair under those circumstances? Yet how could treating
people differently during and after the suspension be fair if it turns
out nothing is really wrong with the rule?
Suspension ultimately failed because the Governor made it clear
that he would accept no bill containing a legislative suspension of
rules. Thus, even if a legislative veto-style proposal had passed, it
would have had difficulty surviving a veto, and even if a veto were
overridden, it would have had difficulty in the courts.
B. Repeal of the APA
The low point in the 1994 Regular Session came when the Senate
Select Committee on Government Reform briefly considered the repeal of the APA, effective in 1996, with the details of its replacement
to be announced. In a session of radical proposals, this was the most
radical. It is hard even to begin to respond to this proposal. Perhaps
the place to start is by outlining the three possible consequences of
repeal. The first is readoption of the present Act. That would create
great uncertainty in the process for a couple of years, but if the Act is
readopted intact and in a timely fashion, no great long-term harm
would result. That, unfortunately, would be unlikely. The second and
third possibilities are more likely. The second is that no new act would
be adopted. This could happen either because no replacement statute
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would be ready for adoption before APA repeal became effective in
1996 or because of an impasse on what a new act should say. In that
event, administrative disputes would pour into the courts. That would
make the resolution of disputes with agencies much more complicated
and expensive than is now the case. Such a morass would not favor
the constituents of the legislators who favor repeal.
The third scenario is that a new act would be developed and
adopted by 1996. Even if that would occur, it would take years for all
those affected by the administrative process to learn the new system.
The costs of such a transition should not be underestimated. Also,
adoption of a new APA would likely place constituents like those who
testified before the Legislature in an even worse position in the future
than they are in now. Why is that likely? Because the present Florida
APA provides an uncommon amount of protection for individual interests against agency abuse.
The likely model for an all new APA is the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981 MSAPA). It is a likely model because it is a uniform act and adoption of a model act can save some of
the costs that are associated with the adoption of an all new statute.
Much thought has been given to the model act and much commentary
already exists. Where ambiguities or difficulties are found, there is
case law from other states to help resolve them. Since many other
states have used the procedural scheme outlined in the 1981 MSAPA,
we know it can work.
The 1981 MSAPA is the only viable model act available. The old
model act, 1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1961
MSAPA), is an unlikely model for a new APA because the old Florida APA, the statute repealed in 1974 to make way for the present act,
was based in part on the 1961 MSAPA. The present APA was
adopted because of the many serious shortcomings of the old APA.
The downside of the 1981 MSAPA, from the perspective of the
Legislature and its constituents, is that it provides much less protection for constituent interests from agency encroachment than the present Florida APA. Perhaps even more troubling for the Legislature,
the 1981 MSAPA provides much less protection of legislative prerogatives from executive encroachment than the present Act, because it
does not include remedies such as the rule challenge remedy.
No Governor is likely to oppose the idea of repeal of the APA. The
executive branch would much prefer an act based on the 1981
MSAPA to the present Act. One theme of legislative proposals made
by the executive branch in this area in recent years has been the repeal
of the section of the act that authorizes proposed rule challenges. Repeal of the present APA would make it easier for the executive branch
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to achieve that goal. The Governor would be unlikely to accept a new
APA that is as strongly supportive of legislative power as the present
one. One certain target would be the rule challenge process.
There is a continuing struggle among the executive, the legislative
and the judicial branches for power within this and any other similar
constitutional government. Any branch that fails to understand which
changes will increase its power and which will diminish its power is
likely to come out the loser. Repeal of the present APA would surrender legislative power to another branch of government. If a new act is
proposed to take the place of the repealed act, it is most unlikely the
new act will be as powerful as the present one in protecting legislative
power from executive encroachment.
The Governor can refuse to sign any bill that he believes is too
tough on the executive branch. If a new act is adopted that provides
less protection against executive encroachment on legislative power,
then the Legislature has lost power to the executive. If an impasse is
reached in negotiations between the Legislature and the Governor,
and no new APA emerges, the Legislature's power is still reduced. In
that case, legislative power Would flow to the courts, who will make
up the rules governing judicial review of agency action in the absence
of legislative direction.
The Legislature should not repeal the APA. A repeal would send
the wrong message to agencies who in 1991 were dragged into grudging compliance with the rulemaking and indexing provisions of the
Act. These new provisions have made it possible for us to know more
about agency policy than we have known in the past. That knowledge
is facilitating voluntary compliance, evenhanded enforcement, and a
clear focus on where problems are and how they can be solved. Repeal, even repeal effective years hence, would do much to encourage
agency noncompliance with APA requirements such as these on the
grounds that, since APA requirements appear to be shortlived, procrastination could save the agency the time and effort of compliance.
C.

The Federalizationof FloridaRulemaking

The "federalization" of the Florida APA is the attempt to reshape
the Florida APA in the image of the federal APA. These attempts are
a concern because the Florida APA was not based upon the federal
Act or even upon the model state act of the day.37 Instead, the Florida

37. 1 have generally opposed all attempts to "federalize" our state's rulemaking system.
Our administrative process is significantly different, and in some ways significantly better, than
the federal system. See, e.g., Maher, supra note 3.
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APA was an attempt to redefine administrative procedure in Florida
to address Florida problems.38 At the time it was adopted, the Florida
APA was hailed as a new model of administrative procedure different
in important and promising ways from previous procedural statutes.3 9
It rejected old approaches and created innovative new procedures that
were a significant improvement over administrative procedures used
40
elsewhere and even procedures developed since the Act's creation.
This promise and history are ignored when the courts and the Legislature turn to federal law to interpret or refine the Florida act.
Federalization can happen in many ways. It can happen when legislators look to the federal rulemaking process for ideas when proposing additional requirements to the Florida rulemaking process. It can
happen when Florida courts cite and analyze federal case law when
deciding cases under the Florida APA. In one case, a Florida court
has gone so far as to adopt federal case law contrary to the plain language of the Florida APA. 41 For some reason, federal administrative
42
law seems to have the strongest influence on Florida rulemaking.
Federal law governing rulemaking is significantly different from
Florida law. Rulemaking requirements imposed by the Florida APA
are uniform, flexible and responsive. If no one cares about a proposed
rule, little process is required to adopt it. If those whose substantial
interests are affected by a proposed rule want to oppose it, a lot of
process is available to analyze and challenge the proposal before or
after its adoption. This flexibility and responsiveness has served Florida well.
In contrast, the federal APA has suffered, since its adoption in
1946, from a serious lack of flexibility and responsiveness in its prescribed rulemaking procedures. 43 Rulemaking procedure under the
federal APA is not as uniform as it is in Florida. First, an agency's
organic act may contain special rulemaking requirements. Second,

38. "The Florida APA reflects a reform spirit and is a reaction to the abuses that made a
wholesale revision of administrative procedure necessary in Florida." Stephen T. Maher, Patricia Ann Dore and the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 953
(1992).
39. See, e.g., Donald W. Brodie & Hans Linde, State Court Review of Administrative Ac(ion: Prescribing the Scope of Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 559-60 (the Florida APA is an
example of a new generation of procedures and contains important innovations).
40. See generally Maher, supra note 3.
41. Adam Smith Enters., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla.
1st DCA 1989); Maher, supra note 3.
42. There are indications that "hard look" review is attractive to the courts. See Adam
Smith. However, that is not something the Legislature is presently considering.
43. For a better annotated overview of federal rulemaking see Maher, supra note 3, at 830-
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even if there are no special requirements, one of two general procedures, formal and informal rulemaking, can be applicable. Which
procedure an agency follows depends upon whether or not Congress
provided for rulemaking "on the record" in the agency's organic act.
In federal law, formal evidentiary proceedings were once more
available during rulemaking, but in recent years formal rulemaking
has become a rarity because of the narrow construction given to that
remedy by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co." This decision moved most rulemaking
into the category of informal rulemaking. The problem this created
was that, since the statute governing informal procedure provided
only a basic framework for notice and comment proceedings, it did
not provide much guidance for solving the practical problems that
arose as that procedural system was implemented.
. As the courts came upon problems that the statute did not address,
their solution was to fill the void left by Congressional inaction by
adding their own procedural requirements to, in effect, make informal
rulemaking more formal. However, the addition of judicially created
formalities for informal rulemaking was neither swift nor sure. This
process took years, and there were missteps along the way. For example, during this period, some federal courts required what became
known as "hybrid rulemaking. ' 45 Some formalities, such as cross-examination of key witnesses, were added to informal proceedings.
While this compromise procedure was viewed as a good approach by
the District of Columbia Circuit because it allowed adjudicative processes to be brought to bear at the crux of the matter without choking
the proceedings with the additional formalities that characterized formal procesc, the United States Supreme Court disapproved of it.46
However, the Court did approve of some other judicially created additions to the rulemaking process, such as the imposition of paper record requirements during rulemaking and hard look review during
judicial review. The process in federal rulemaking today is a combination of a court imposed minuet of notices, responses and counterresponses in the FederalRegister, and close review of rulemaking in the
courts.
Florida has been spared this painful ad hoc development of its rulemaking procedure because the Florida APA was so complete and well

44. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
45. See RICHARD J.PIERCE, ET AL., ADmiNISTRATME LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4.9 (1992) for a
more thorough discussion of "hybrid" rulemaking.

46.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435

U.S. 519 (1978).
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drafted on this point from its inception. The procedure in Florida is
much different and in some ways much better than the procedure that
has emerged in federal law. Florida rulemaking is not paper minuet.
When requested by affected parties, full evidentiary hearings are
available both to inform the agency of the evidence and arguments it
might have missed in drafting the proposed rule and to challenge the
validity of the proposed rule. When the rule draws no interest, no
pointless formalities are required. The rule is simply adopted. In the
area of judicial review, the Florida APA does not require hard look
47
review. Detailed parameters for judicial review are set out in the Act.
Given this history, why do people continue to look to federal law
for guidance in this area? This is one of the great mysteries of Florida
administrative procedure. Nevertheless, such efforts continue. During
the 1994 Regular Session, a strong attempt was made to add paperwork requirements to Florida rulemaking similar to those found in
federal law. Attempts to require agencies to respond in writing to
comments made during rulemaking were proposed. Those were only
the first steps in federalizing the APA by legislatively requiring a paper minuet like the one that now exists in federal law.
Paperwork requirements are no match for real evidentiary hearings.
There does not seem to be much debate on this point. There was certainly no move to repeal any of the evidentiary hearing requirements
that the Act now contains. Thus, if new paperwork requirements are
passed, they would be in addition to present requirements, and would
make the process even less efficient than it is now.
How inefficient these paperwork requirements will make the process depends on their particulars. If written explanations are required
about many aspects of rulemaking, and are required for all rules
whether or not anyone has challenged the rule or asked for the explanations, then the efficiency costs could be significant. The addition of
complex paperwork requirements during rulemaking also risks unbalancing the process by allowing special interest groups greater influence
over rulemaking than they now have, and by making it more difficult
for agencies to do their jobs effectively. Before we make all rulemaking more burdensome and more time consuming, even in situations
where no one objects to a proposed rule, we should recognize that our
process can already be quite inefficient and we should determine
whether the addition of paperwork is really necessary.

47. Unfortunately, the courts have largely ignored section 120.68 Florida Statutes, and have
created their own review standards, standards that are too often vague, contradictory and confusing. See, Maher, supra note 3, at 811-28.
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The reason that people have come to support the addition of burdensome paperwork requirements on agencies is clear. Some agencies
have not always behaved as they should during rulemaking. A rulemaking hearing that consists of no more procedure than a sign-in
sheet and a tape recorder run by a person who knows nothing about
the proposed rule certainly appears less than meaningful, although it
may not violate the technical requirements of the APA. It is frustrating to spend the time and money needed to prepare for and participate
in a rulemaking hearing and to receive absolutely no feedback from
the agency. Some agencies have demonstrated an aversion to input at
rulemaking hearings. But this problem is not universal. There are
agencies that listen and respond. Sometimes input at rulemaking hearings causes agencies to revise their rules. Existing APA provisions may
be available to secure agency attention during rulemaking if they seem
inattentive .4
The Legislature can be involved in addressing these problems without burdening all agencies with new requirements. The Legislature can
and should take agencies that give people the "silent treatment" during rulemaking to task during legislative oversight hearings. If that
does not get the agency's attention, the Legislature can drive the point
home during the appropriations process. The effectiveness of this kind
of oversight should not be discounted.
The Legislature should recognize that .adding paperwork requirements will put power over rulemaking beyond the reach of legislative
oversight or appropriations. It will put power over rulemaking in the
courts. The shift will occur in the following manner. The determination of whether a comment has received adequate response from an
agency would be subject to more than one opinion. This ambiguity
gives the courts flexibility to decide whether to hold agencies to paperwork requirements on the basis of unstated reasons. Judges are human, and they sometimes allow their feelings about the substance of

48. The filing of a rule challenge under section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes, together with a
request for a rulemaking hearing under section 120.54(3), Florida Statutes, in circumstances
where both are appropriate, can grab an agency's attention quite effectively. Section
120.54(4)(a), Florida Statutes provides:
Any substantially affected person may seek an administrative determination of the
invalidity of any proposed rule on the ground that the proposed rule is an invalid
exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Section 120.54(3)(a) provides in relevant part:
If the intended action concerns any rule other than one relating exclusively to organization, procedure, or practice, the agency shall, on the request of any affected person
received within 21 days after the date of publication of the notice, give affected persons an opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues under consideration appropriate to inform it of their contentions.
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the agency action under review to affect their determination of the
seriousness of a procedural flaw found in the record. Judges are, in
most cases, not experts on the subject matter of agency disputes. A
good argument can be made that, for this reason, judges should confine their judicial review to technical points. But the reality is that
they are not so confined.
Thus, paperwork requirements in rulemaking, such as those proposed during 1994, will allow courts to strike down rules they do not
like and uphold rules that they do like. The courts need not acknowledge the fact that they are motivated by their personal likes and dislikes. The rationales they give will be the presence or absence of
"full" agency responses. One opinion will say a certain agency response to commentary is inadequate, another will say that a very similar response is adequate. Lawyers will puzzle over these inconsistent
opinions, and will ultimately be left to argue some distinction between
the two. One thing will be clear: paperwork requirements will give the
courts greater power to decide which rules are adopted and which are
not.
When the courts frustrate the adoption of rules favored by the Legislature, the Legislature will see in dramatic fashion how it has lost
power through this change. The Legislature will then have even less
power to influence the courts in informal ways than it now has to
influence the executive branch. Legislative use of oversight or appropriations will not be able to influence the courts. To formally influence the courts, the Legislature must either get the Governor to sign
new legislation or override his veto if he refuses.
The popularity of federalization in the Legislature is difficult to explain for another reason. In the federal system, power over rulemaking was not explicitly ceded to the courts by Congress. The courts
stepped in to fill the vacuum after Congress failed to provide the
needed guidance concerning rulemaking requirements. In Florida,
there is no vacuum to fill. The APA defines rulemaking requirements
with great clarity. Here, the Legislature is proposing that it simply
give away its power.
This proposal is particularly surprising in light of recent Florida history. In Adam Smith Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation,49 the First District Court of Appeal tried to adopt
rulemaking requirements similar to those proposed in the Legislature
in 1994. I strongly criticized this federalization of the rulemaking
process in 1991.10 The legislative reaction to Adam Smith was swift
49.
50.

553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Maher, supra note 3, at 811.
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and sure. The 1992 amendments to the APA prevented these new requirements announced in Adam Smith from having any effect on rulemaking by abolishing direct appeal of rules to the District Courts of
Appeal in almost all cases. This development had the effect of avoiding the federal style requirements that the court had decreed, but the
result was achieved at great cost to the process. This legislative response was like an animal escaping from a trap by chewing off its leg.
It is therefore quite surprising to see the Legislature seriously considering the adoption of requirements very similar to those that it narrowly escaped only two years ago.
D. Two Tiersfor Rulemaking
Another proposal that gained support during the 1994 Regular Session was the suggestion that rulemaking procedure be changed to create two-tier stages of rulemaking in place of the present single-tier
system. Under the proposed two-tier approach, in the first tier the
agency would decide on a final proposed rule. During the second tier,
the final proposed rule would be subject to challenge. If it survived
challenge, it would be adopted.
What would be the result if this proposal were adopted? First, twotiered rulemaking would increase the time needed to adopt all rules.
Second, it would increase costs of adopting all rules, because extra
money would be spent in providing published notices that most likely
would go unread. Third, it would not provide significant benefits to
justify these added delays and costs. This leads us to the fourth point.
Why did the Florida business community, that traditionally rails
against wasteful bureaucracy, endorse this proposal?
The proposal of tiered rulemaking will delay the adoption of all
rules because it will split a one-step process into two steps. Each step
requires published notice and requires that time be allowed between
the publication of notice and the anticipated responses so that participation can occur. These changes will not only create delays, they will
create delays in both contested and uncontested cases. A large number
of rules are adopted without opposition. If all rules must go through
this two step process, a circumstance which seems inescapable because
objections cannot be known until the final proposal is published, then
much wasted effort will result from this two-step system.
Delay is not the only problem. If adopted, these changes would also
increase the costs of rulemaking while providing very little real benefit. They would require the publication of at least twice as many rulemaking notices, one for initial rulemaking and one for final
rulemaking. This would be done even in the case of uncontested rules.
This would not only cost taxpayers more, it will double the size of the
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FloridaAdministrative Weekly, a development sure to be used as an
example of bureaucracy out of control. Yet this would not be the result of bureaucratic action, it would be the result of a legislative package sponsored by the Florida Chamber of Commerce.
What justification can be advanced to support this proposal in light
of the delay and expense it will create, especially given the fact that
much of the delay and expense is pointless because it is connected with
uncontested rules? Some are concerned that, where an agency changes
a rule based upon comments received during rulemaking, the ability
of other private interest groups in rulemaking to participate may be
compromised. For example, an agency may propose a rule that Group
A supports and Group B opposes. Group A does not file a challenge
because it supports the proposal, but Group B both files a section
120.54(4) rule challenge and participates in the section 120.54(3) rulemaking hearing. In response to these proceedings, the agency then
changes the proposed rule so it is favorable to Group B and opposed
by Group A. If the agency decides not to republish the rule, and thus
begin rulemaking all over again to give Group A the same chance to
challenge the rule as Group B, Group A may argue that it has been
deprived of its rights of full participation in the process. Without republication, the time will have passed for filing a section 120.54(4)
challenges, and the agency can adopt its revised rule without opposition. Two-tier rulemaking would prevent this from happening, the argument goes, because everyone will know the final proposal, and the
agency would not be permitted to change the proposal in response to
challenges.
If this is the real reason for two tiers, the proposal is a solution out
of proportion to the problem. The problem set out in the above example is not common. In the few situations it does occur, it can be handled within existing procedure. Sometimes "anticipatory rule
challenges" are filed against rules that people favor to guard against
the fact that the rules may be changed in an unfavorable way during
the process. Also, the refusal to republish is only a limited protection
against challenge. A proposed rule may avoid a section 120.54(4) challenge through a refusal to renotice, but it may not avoid a section
120.56 rule challenge in that manner. A section 120.56 existing rule
challenge is still available against any invalid rule that might emerge
from the rulemaking process. In fact, an agency action like refusing to
republish after significant change may provide the basis for a rule
challenge even if no basis existed before that mistake was made.
If any legislative change is made to address this problem, it should
be limited to adding a more explicit requirement of republication
when an agency makes major changes to a proposed rule. This would
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solve any problem that may exist without the great delay and cost incurred with the two tier proposal.
Some try to justify the two tier proposal on the ground that it will
lessen the leverage of special interests during rulemaking. There is no
question that the pendency of a proposed rule challenge provides the
challengers with leverage during rulemaking. It is not uncommon to
see such challenges dismissed when changes are made to the proposed
rule. Some say that the two tier proposal will lessen that leverage by
permitting proposed rule challenges only during that second rulemaking tier and by allowing no revisions to the final proposed rule during
that second tier. The argument is made that this "locked in concrete"
approach will prevent the challenge from giving the challenger any
leverage in negotiating changes to the final proposed rule.
First, this argument is naive. The second-tier proposed rule may be
locked in concrete, but the first-tier proposal is not. What prevents
challengers from drafting their challenges and showing the agency the
drafts of what they plan to file in the second tier in order to influence
the substance of the final proposed rule? If the challengers have a
good basis for blocking the proposed rule, but really only want a few
changes made to the proposal, why should the agency refuse to make
reasonable compromises to avoid a fight? Is it not irresponsible to
refuse to make a reasonable compromise, to fight, to lose, and to then
have no choice but to begin all over again?
What the two-tier proposal will really do is make it easier and less
costly for special interests to have leverage over the rulemaking process. The two-tier proposal will encourage those who threaten to challenge the proposed rule in the second tier to walk around waving the
unfiled challenge during the first tier. This will give potential challengers some of the leverage of a proposed rule challenge without the pressure of needing to actually get it filed within twenty-one days of the
notice, and it will save the cost of actually being required to litigate
the challenge once filed. Thus, the two-tier proposal is responsive to
special interests who have complained that the proposed challenge is
powerful but expensive, especially when agencies decide to fight rather
than compromise. The two-tier approach preserves some of the potential leverage of the challenge, while lowering the cost because it can
provide benefits even if the challenge is never actually filed.
The only reasonable justification for the business community's support of this proposal is that it would allow business interests to harness some of the power of a proposed rule challenge without the cost.
This is very little benefit for the delay and cost this change will bring
to the entire system, a cost that the business community and other
taxpayers must shoulder. It seems hypocritical for business groups to
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call for the abolition of bureaucratic cost and delay in the abstract
while at the same time supporting proposals like this that use those
very concepts to advance their interests at everyone else's expense.
E.

Simplified Process at DOAH

Beginning the summer before the 1994 Regular Session, there was a
sense that there was a need for simplified process in some Division of
Administrative Hearings (DOAH) cases, including simple licensing
cases where the licensee was pro se and was facing only minor disciplinary action. Suggested simplifications included dispensing with discovery and expediting the process.
From the beginning of this discussion, there was a concern that a
simplified process, if used in the wrong types of cases, could lead to
abuse. For example, if this kind of simplified process were used in a
controversial matter where the real dispute was between the parties
and a possible intervenor, could the parties to the proceedings agree to
invoke the simplified process to permit no discovery and expedite the
case to shut out potential intervenors, or to make it more difficult for
intervenors to participate effectively?
Abstract concerns with the general proposal gave way to more serious concerns when the discussion turned to adding other features to
the simplified process. The suggestion was made that this simplified
process be an "opt-out," that is litigants at DOAH would find themselves in the simplified process unless they took some affirmative action to escape it.' Also, the suggestion was made that discovery
should be permitted in the simplified process, at the discretion of the
DOAH hearing officer. In addition, the suggestion was made that
DOAH hearing officers should have final order authority in these
cases. Thus, if a procedure that follows these suggestions were
adopted, a complex case could enter this process, still involve discovery be finally decided by DOAH. These additional suggestions change
the face of simplified process to the degree that some people suspect
that "simplified process" may be a vehicle to advance an entirely different agenda.

51. Mann, Reforming the APA: Legislative Adventures in the Labyrinth, 22 FLA. ST. U. L.
307, 316 (1994). This suggestion gave way, in the final version of the legislation that did
not pass, to a provision that would let any party seek simplified procedure and would give the
DOAH hearing officer the power to decide whether simplified procedure would be employed.
Seven "factors" were put in the proposal to serve as a guidt for this determination. While Sally
Bond Mann advances these factors as a check on DOAH authority, Id. at 314, n.35 the large
number of factors which can be given varying weight, and the relative vagueness of the factors,
can also be viewed as making DOAH decisions and making any decision to adopt a simplified
process more difficult to reverse in an appellate court.
REV.
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Why must simplified process be an opt-out, permit discovery, and
place final order authority in DOAH? Are most DOAH cases appropriate for this type of resolution? The way the simplified process proposal was drafted, it could probably be applied in a large number of
cases. The suggestion not to prohibit all discovery, and instead to allow discovery at the discretion of the DOAH hearing officer, removes
the certainty of saving costs by electing the simplified procedure. Prohibiting all discovery in the simplified process would guarantee that
people agreeing to the process would know from the outset what they
were getting into.
Some suspect that the simplified process initiative is not just about
simplicity, it is the first step in an attempt to wrest final order authority from agencies and place it in DOAH. The Act generally gives the
agency, not DOAH, the authority to enter a final order when DOAH
hears the case under a referral from the agency. The proposed simplified process could revolutionize this routine if it is widely used and
allows agencies to be dragged into proceedings where they have no
final order authority against their will. The argument can be made
that, in small cases, agency discretion is not that important while efficiency is. Since it would save time and money for DOAH to simply
enter final orders in such cases, the argument runs, it should be permitted to do so. But that tells only part of the story. The other part of
the story, the part that was not fairly discussed when the bill was
heard in committee, is that the simplified procedure created by this
proposal could well affect cases that are neither simple nor small.
What "simplification" may well do, if it is adopted in the form proposed, is strip administrative agencies of their final order authority in
a wide variety of cases. Even without making a judgment about
whether stripping agencies of final order authority is a good Or a bad
thing, it should be obvious that such a significant change in the procedural system created by the Act should at least be debated on its merits. The House Select Committee that voted this proposal out to the
floor was not told that this proposal could have far reaching consequences on the shape of administrative adjudication under the Act.
Such an important change should not be made by accident, or even
accidentally on purpose, as the case may be here.
Some profess not to understand what all the fuss is about in placing
final order authority in DOAH. Those individuals must not have been
paying much attention to recent debates concerning the way the APA
should be structured. Whether or not DOAH should have final order
authority has not only been part of a continuing debate, it is a fundamental debate about the structure of administrative adjudication under the APA and the power of administrative agencies within that
structure. Some favor giving final order authority to DOAH and some
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do not, but there has never been any doubt where the Governor and
others in the executive branch have stood on this issue. Where they
stand is where they sit. They oppose giving DOAH final order authority because executive agencies have the most to lose if this change is
adopted.52 The Legislature, thus far, has refused to move final order
authority to DOAH in section 120.57 cases.
V.

CONCLUSION

The failure to adopt amendments to the APA in 1994 was a good
result. I hope we can think more carefully about whether change is
needed, what change is needed and how change should be accomplished before the Legislature makes any new changes to the APA.
Others see the failure to amend the APA as a lost opportunity, and
fault the executive branch for defeating change. For example, Sally
Bond Mann blames the entrenched bureaucracy" and the Governor
for protecting the executive branch, and charges that the Governor
has not been true to his campaign promises to right-size and streamline government.
I have a different view. I believe that the executive branch, did too
little to defend itself during the session and gave away too much too
early in making its deal with the House that it almost caused passage
of the proposed legislation. I am critical of the Governor and the
agencies of this state for doing so little to preserve a process that they
know is working and must continue to work well if agencies are to do
their jobs effectively.
I hope that rather than attempting to place blame for what occurred, or what did not occur, people will begin to think in more constructive terms. In this Article, I have tried to suggest a framework for
examining the need for change because I anticipate that changes to the
APA will be proposed again in the 1995 Regular Session. Through
tough questioning, clear thinking, and a respect for what has come
52. Sally Bond Mann argues that the Governor changed his position on this issue and refused to support giving DOAH final authority in the simplified procedure. The circumstances
related were that the Governor's change in position came when legal counsel for a state agency,
who had not participated earlier, objected to that aspect of the procedure. Mann, supra note 14
at 58. To the extent that this is intended to suggest that the Legislature was shocked to hear that
the Governor and others in the executive branch were opposed to placing final authority in
DOAH, it is difficult to accept. Executive branch opposition to placing any form of final order
authority in DOAH is, and was, well known to all. Neither this well known executive opposition,
nor the controversial nature of this proposal, were explained when the simplified procedure proposal came before the House Select Committee on Agency Rules and Administrative Procedures.
In fact, from the presentation and discussion, it appeared that this proposal was not controversial.
53. See Mann, supra note 14, at 60.
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before, we can right-size and streamline the 1995 APA legislative
agenda. The people of Florida will benefit from this kind of effort.

